

Assessing the Security and Resilience of Mobile Broadband Networks for PPDR

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“... the ability of a network to defend against and maintain an acceptable level of service in the presence of challenges”


RESILIENCE.



A Strategy for Network Resilience

$D^2R^2 + DR$ consists of 2 loops


- Real-time control (internal) loop
- Background (external) loop



Partially
validated in:



Measuring the Resilience of Networks – the R Value




The Nature of Resilience Challenges: Incident Classes


- **Natural phenomena** – severe weather, earthquakes, floods, pandemic diseases, wildfires, wildlife, and so on.
- **Human errors** – errors committed by employees of the provider or outside the provider, during the operation of equipment or facilities, the use of tools, the execution of procedures, etc
- **Malicious attacks** – a deliberate act by someone or some organisation, e.g. a Denial of Service attack disrupting the service, or a cable theft.
- **System failures** – technical failures of a system, for example caused by hardware failures, software bugs or flaws in manuals, procedures or policies.
- **Third party failures** – a failure or incident at a third party. The category is used in conjunctions with one of the other four root cause categories.




The Nature of Resilience Challenges



Average duration of incidents per root cause category (hours).




Average number of user connections affected per incident per root cause (1000s)



% Incidents per root cause category

Resilience Challenges Are Therefore ...



Key question:

**To what extent are
organisation and *individual*
challenges computable to get a
measure or resilience?**

An Approach to Measuring Resilience

Analysis

Measure, Derive

Resilience Classes

Resilience class « (trustworthiness, challenge tolerance) »	Operational State		
	Normal Operation	Partially Degraded	Severely Degraded
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gold (Au) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> normal operation ensures acceptable service Silver (Ag) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> only partial degradation ensures at most impaired service Bronze (CuSn) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> no assurance of service 			

An abstraction to support the specification of desired resilience indicator levels

Critical infrastructure specification, including technical (ICT), target infrastructure, organisational aspects, ...

Critical infrastructures in which ICT plays an important central role

Threat Specification: natural, human, (un)intended, ...

A broad variety of threats considered

R-value Evaluation

Metric Envelopes, Coupled network analysis, measuring cascading effects, ...

Resilience indicator $R = [0, 1]$, relate to Resilience Classes

Resilience Indicator R

Evaluate monetary cost, social well-being, safety and reputation risks

Consider Resilience Indicator R in terms of important socio-economic risk factors

Conclusion

- Ensuring the **resilience** of mobile networks for PPDR is as important as **security**
 - For various reasons, malicious actors will succeed in compromising these systems, and networks must remain operational
- It is important to take an approach that considers **resilience by design**, e.g., based on the D²R²+DR strategy
 - To determine how effective a design is, we need suitable **metrics** and approaches to **measuring resilience**
- Resilience challenges are **technical**, **organisational** and **individual** in nature
 - A key research challenge is determining methods for measuring these aspects in a unified manner

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